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What Are Pensions? 
Pension plans are benefits offered by many 
employers that provide workers with cash payments 
in retirement. In 2006, about 24 percent of Americans 
age 65 and older received pension benefits from past 
private-sector employers, and about 11 percent 
received benefits from past public-sector employers 
(Purcell 2007a). Median annual benefits in 2006 were 
about $7,200 among older adults receiving private 
pensions and $14,400 for those receiving pensions 
from government employers.  
There are two basic types of employer-sponsored 
pension plans. Defined benefit (DB) plans, once the 
most common type, promise specific monthly 
retirement benefits that usually last until death. 
Defined contribution (DC) plans, which now 
dominate, function essentially as individual tax-
deferred retirement savings accounts into which both 
employers and employees usually contribute. Cash 
balance plans are hybrids that combine features of 
DB and DC plans. Each plan type affects individual 
retirement incomes and employer costs differently 
and raises distinct public policy issues. 
How Do Benefits Accumulate? 
DB plans base payments on formulas that usually 
depend on earnings and service years. A typical 
formula in the private sector sets annual benefits 
equal to 1 percent of average annual salary for each 
year of service. Most public-sector plan formulas are 
more generous, with typical multipliers of around 1.5 
percent. Sometimes the earnings base includes all 
years that the participant worked at the employer, but 
more commonly it includes only the most recent 
years, such as the last five. A few plans set benefit 
payments equal to some fixed annual amount per 
year of service, regardless of earnings.  
DC plans do not promise specific retirement 
benefits. Instead, employers that provide 401(k)-type 
plans—the most common type of DC plan—
contribute to a retirement account in the participant’s 
name, usually as a specific percentage of salary.1 
Employees can also contribute to their retirement 
accounts and defer taxes on their contributions until 
they withdraw funds from their accounts. Employer 
contributions sometimes depend on how much the 
participant contributes. Some employers, for 
example, match worker contributions up to a specific 
amount, providing few benefits to employees who 
contribute little to their retirement plans. Account 
balances grow over time with contributions and 
investment returns. 
Hybrid pension plans combine features of DB 
and DC plans. In cash balance plans, the most 
common type of hybrid plan, employers set aside a 
given percentage of salary for each employee and 
credit interest on these contributions. Interest credit 
rates are generally tied to some benchmark, such as 
the U.S. Treasury bill rate. Benefits are expressed as 
an account balance, as in DC plans, but these 
balances are only bookkeeping devices. Plans pay 
benefits from commingled funds invested in a 
pension trust on behalf of all participants.  
In all plan types, participants must usually 
remain with the employer a specific number of years 
to receive subsidized benefits. Federal law limits how 
long participants must wait before their benefits 
“vest” and ownership transfers from the employer to 
the employee. In most DB and hybrid plans, benefits 
must fully vest within five years if vesting occurs all 
at once or seven years if it occurs gradually over 
time. In DC plans, employer contributions must fully 
vest within three years, or six years if vesting occurs 
gradually. Employee contributions, however, vest 
immediately and never revert to the employer.  
How Are Benefits Received? 
DB plan benefits are generally paid in monthly 
installments to retirees who have reached the plan’s 
eligibility age, and payments last until death. 
Surviving spouses also receive benefits unless both 
partners waive survivor protection in exchange for 
higher payouts while the plan participant is alive. 
Federal law requires DB plans to offer these payment 
schemes, known as lifetime annuities, although some 
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DB plan sponsors permit retirees to receive benefits 
as lump-sum payments.2 Few private-sector plans 
adjust benefits paid during retirement for inflation, 
although cost-of-living escalators are common in the 
public sector. Most DB plans also pay reduced 
benefits to participants who retire when they reach 
the plan’s early retirement age.  
Cash balance plans must also offer a lifetime 
annuity with an expected value equal to the 
participant’s account balance. Most participants, 
however, choose to receive their benefits as lump-
sum distributions (Schieber 2003).  
DC plan beneficiaries receive the funds that have 
accumulated in their accounts, generally as lump-sum 
distributions. Few DC plan sponsors offer annuities. 
Beneficiaries can use their account balances to 
purchase an annuity from an insurance company, but 
few people do so, partly because the terms offered by 
insurance companies are not very favorable.  
DC plan participants can collect whenever they 
separate from the employer. Distributions received 
before age 59½ , however, are subject to a 10-percent 
penalty, unless they are rolled over into an Individual 
Retirement Account or lifetime annuity. Many plans 
allow departing employees to keep their balances in 
the plan and withdraw at a later date. People must 
begin withdrawing from their 401(k) plans once they 
reach age 70½, unless they are still working.  
Benefits from DB, cash balance, and DC plans 
are generally subject to ordinary income tax when 
they are received. Participants can, however, deduct 
any after-tax contributions they made to the plan. 
Who Pays for Benefits? 
Employers that sponsor DB and hybrid plans set 
aside funds to cover expected future benefits. 
Employers invest these funds in a mix of equities and 
interest-earning securities. Most public-sector 
employees must contribute a percentage of salary to 
their DB plans, but few private-sector DB plan 
participants contribute.  
The federal government’s Pension Benefit 
Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) insures private DB 
and hybrid plans, assuming responsibility for pension 
payments up to a certain amount if the employer 
declares bankruptcy. (In 2007 PBGC guaranteed 
annual benefits up to $49,500 per participant to those 
who began collecting at age 65 but less to those who 
collected earlier.) In return, plan sponsors must pay 
PBGC monthly premiums and adhere to specific 
funding requirements. Because of certain exceptions, 
however, many private-sector plans are underfunded, 
with insufficient reserves to cover expected payouts. 
In 2006, the shortfall among underfunded single-
employer plans totaled $350 billion, about 28 percent 
of total liabilities (PBGC 2006). 
State and local government DB plans are not 
federally insured and are not subject to federal 
funding requirements. In 2006, 20 states had less than 
80 percent of the funds necessary to cover long-term 
pension obligations, and the total shortfall for all 
states reached $361 billion (Pew Center on the States 
2007).  
Funding issues do not generally arise in DC 
plans because they do not promise specific benefits. 
Instead, participants receive whatever accumulates in 
the account. Employees usually have some control 
over how the funds are invested.  
As with all employee benefits, workers 
ultimately pay most pension costs. Employers 
combine salary and benefits to compensate workers 
for their productive activities, offsetting higher 
benefit costs with lower salaries. Because DB plans 
promise specific benefits, however, employers with 
DB plans generally end up paying more if investment 
returns fall short of expectations or workers live 
longer than anticipated and thus collect benefits 
longer. 
How Do Pension Plans Affect 
Retirement Decisions? 
Most traditional DB plans encourage early retirement 
and penalize workers who remain on the job after 
they become eligible to receive pension benefits. DB 
benefit formulas typically pay more for more years of 
service, but workers forgo a year of retirement 
benefits for every year that they remain on the job 
past the plan’s retirement age. The increase in annual 
benefits from an additional work year does not fully 
offset the loss from the reduction in the number of 
pension payments, lowering lifetime benefits. These 
retirement incentives may become counterproductive 
as the workforce ages and firms strive to retain older 
workers.  
DC and cash balance plans do not discourage 
work at older ages because they express benefits as 
account balances that can continue to grow 
throughout the worker’s career. In fact, workers in 
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DC plans generally retire about two years later than 
those in DB plans (Friedberg and Webb 2005). 
Who Participates in Pension Plans? 
In 2007, 51 percent of private-sector workers—about 
57 million people—participated in employer-
sponsored retirement plans (Bureau of Labor 
Statistics [BLS] 2007).3 In the public sector, pension 
coverage is nearly universal (Munnell and Soto 
2007a). Private-sector coverage rates are higher 
among unionized workers and full-time workers, and 
rates are lower among low-wage workers, blacks, and 
Hispanics. In 2006, for example, 55 percent of non-
Hispanic whites participated in employer-sponsored 
pension plans, compared with only about 44 percent 
of non-Hispanic blacks and 28 percent of Hispanics 
(Purcell 2007b).  
How Has Coverage Changed? 
Although overall pension coverage rates among 
private-sector workers have remained fairly steady 
over the past three decades, there has been a dramatic 
shift from DB to DC plans. Between 1980 and 2007, 
the share of private-sector workers participating in 
DB plans fell from 39 to 20 percent, while the share 
participating in only DC plans increased from 8 to 31 
percent (figure 1). Assets in private DC plans nearly 
doubled between 1997 and 2007, growing from $2.3 
trillion to $4.4 trillion, while private DB plan assets 
increased only modestly, rising from $1.8 trillion to 
$2.4 trillion (Investment Company Institute 2007). 
Private-sector DB plan coverage remains high, 
however, among unionized workers (67 percent) and 
workers in firms with 100 or more employees (32 
percent) (BLS 2007).  
The decline in the heavily unionized 
manufacturing sector, recent increases in the 
administrative costs of complying with the complex 
federal regulations that govern DB plans, and 
accounting rule changes that now require employers 
to report pension liabilities on their balance sheets 
have contributed to the erosion in DB plan coverage 
(Ippolito 1995; Munnell and Soto 2007b).  
Conversions to cash balance plans, which are 
classified as DB plans for legal and regulatory 
purposes, have compounded the decline in traditional 
DB plans. Cash balance plans, which did not exist 
before 1985, provided coverage for 23 percent of all 
private-sector workers in DB plans in 2005 (BLS 
2005).  
DB plans continue to dominate in the public 
sector, which employs about one-sixth of the 
workforce. In 2004, 86 percent of state and local 
government employees, and nearly all federal 
government employees, participated in defined 
benefit plans (Munnell and Soto 2007a). The federal 
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government and some state and local governments 
also offer supplemental DC plans. Recent efforts by 
some jurisdictions, including the state of California, 
to move to DC plans have not been very successful, 
primarily because of the opposition of powerful 
public unions. Only two states, Michigan and Alaska, 
require new hires to join a DC plan (Munnell et al. 
2008). 
How Has the Decline of Traditional DB 
Plans Affected Retirement Security? 
There are advantages and disadvantages to both DB 
and DC plans, and the net effect of the shift to DC 
plans is not yet clear. By providing a guaranteed 
benefit that lasts from retirement to death, DB plans 
offer retirement income security for workers who 
remain with single employers for most of their 
careers.  
Workers who often change employers, however, 
do not earn many benefits in DB plans. DB plan 
benefits accumulate rapidly in the years immediately 
before retirement age. Additional work years increase 
benefits not only by adding an additional percentage 
of pay but also by raising the value of previously 
accumulated benefits by both real wage growth and 
inflation. Consequently, workers in DB plans 
generally lose substantial benefits if they are laid off 
or the firm goes out of business late in their careers. 
The federal government insures DB benefits that 
have already been earned, but participants forgo the 
rapid run-up in pension benefits that they would have 
received if they had remained employed until the 
plan’s retirement age.  
Workers in DC plans, by contrast, don’t 
necessarily lose benefits if they change jobs because 
their account balances can continue earning 
investment returns after they separate from their 
employer. DC plans, then, are well suited to today’s 
increasingly mobile workforce. 
DC plan participants face other kinds of risks, 
especially the uncertainty surrounding investment 
returns. Workers with bad investment luck or who 
make unwise choices may end up with little 
retirement income. Another drawback is that workers 
generally have to sign up with their employer to 
participate in DC plans and then agree to have funds 
withheld from their paychecks. Only 77 percent of 
eligible private-sector workers at firms that offer DC 
plans participated in 2007 (BLS 2007), and only 6 
percent contributed the maximum amount allowed by 
law in 2003 (Kawachi, Smith, and Toder 2006).  
To accumulate substantial retirement savings, 
DC plan participants must also resist the temptation 
to cash in their account balances when they change 
jobs. For example, only 45 percent of people age 21 
to 57 in 2003 who received a lump sum distribution 
from an employer plan rolled any part of it into 
another retirement account (Verma and Lichtenstein 
2006).  
DC plan retirees also run the risk of spending 
their balances too quickly, leaving them with 
inadequate income at very old ages, or spending too 
slowly and not making the most of their retirement 
savings (Butrica and Mermin 2007). DB plan 
beneficiaries do not generally face these risks 
because most receive lifetime annuities that provide 
regular monthly payments from retirement until 
death. Relatively few employers allow DC plan 
participants to convert their balances into lifetime 
annuities, and annuities purchased from insurance 
companies are expensive because only those people 
who live the longest tend to purchase them.  
Although the growing popularity of cash balance 
plans among employers has been controversial, these 
plans may provide more retirement security than 
either DC plans or traditional DB plans (Johnson and 
Uccello 2004). Unlike in traditional DB plans, 
benefits in cash balance plans accumulate gradually 
over the career, enabling workers who change jobs 
frequently to accumulate substantial retirement 
benefits. They also contain many advantages of 
traditional DB coverage, including automatic 
enrollment, federal government insurance of benefits, 
and mandatory annuity options for benefit payout. 
Additionally, benefits in cash balance plans are 
subject to less investment risk than DC balances.  
What Are the Key Policy Issues? 
• Promoting Retirement Savings among 
Workers without Employer-Sponsored Plans: 
Recent attention has focused on boosting 
retirement savings for the nearly two-fifths of 
private-sector workers employed at firms that 
do not offer retirement plans (BLS 2007). One 
approach has been the recently enacted saver’s 
credit, which provides federal government 
matches of up to 50 percent of the first $2,000 
in retirement savings by low-income adults. 
The government contribution, however, comes 
as a nonrefundable tax credit and thus does 
not benefit savers who do not earn enough to 
pay taxes.  
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Some proposals would expand the saver’s 
credit by providing a refundable tax credit to 
low-income savers. Other proposals would 
require employers to allow workers to make 
payroll-deduction deposits to Individual 
Retirement Accounts or 401(k) plans, perhaps 
with a government match (Calabrese 2007; 
Iwry and John 2006). These proposals would 
not force employers to contribute.  
• Boosting DC Plan Participation and 
Contributions: The 2006 Pension Protection 
Act (PPA) made it easier for employers to 
enroll workers in DC plans automatically, 
which can substantially increase participation 
rates (Choi et al. 2004; Gale, Iwry, and Orszag 
2006). Only about one-third of employers 
automatically enrolled participants in 2007, 
although about half of remaining employers 
said they were at least somewhat likely to do 
so in the coming year (Hewitt Associates 
2007).  
PPA also made recent increases in 401(k)-plan 
contribution limits permanent. In 2008, 
individuals can contribute up to $15,500 a 
year to their 401(k) plans, and participants age 
50 and older can contribute an additional 
$5,000. Some argue that these limits should be 
raised even higher, but higher contribution 
limits do not appear to boost savings much 
(Kawachi et al. 2006). And about 70 percent 
of the tax benefits from new DC-plan 
contributions in 2004 went to the fifth of tax 
filing units with the highest incomes; more 
than 50 percent of the benefits went to the top 
10 percent (Burman et al. 2004).   
• Promoting Sensible Distributions from DC 
Plans: Because few DC plans allow 
participants to collect their benefits as lifetime 
annuities, the decline in DB plan coverage 
may substantially reduce the future number of 
retirees with guaranteed payment streams 
outside Social Security. One solution might be 
to promote deferred annuities that begin at age 
80 or 85, insuring people against the risk of 
running out of money if they live to very old 
ages.  
• Preventing Leakages from DC Plans: 
Tightening rules that permit workers to dip 
into their retirement savings when they change 
jobs could increase resources available for old 
age. Some workers, however, may be less 
likely to contribute to retirement plans if they 
could never access their funds at earlier ages.  
• Improving Financial Literacy: As 
responsibility for retirement planning falls 
increasingly on families and individuals, the 
ability to make informed financial decisions is 
becoming increasingly urgent. People need to 
decide how much to save in DC plans, how to 
invest their contributions, and how to convert 
their account balances into payment streams 
that will support them in retirement. Yet, only 
43 percent of surveyed workers in 2007 said 
they have tried calculating how much money 
they will need for retirement, and many 
appear to underestimate retirement needs 
(EBRI 2007). Better access to professional 
investment advice at work could improve 
retirement planning. 
• Shoring up Finances of Private-Sector DB 
Plans: Employer bankruptcies could force the 
PBGC to assume responsibility for many 
unfunded pension liabilities, threatening the 
agency’s solvency and raising the possibility 
of a taxpayer bailout. PPA tightened funding 
requirements and increased the insurance 
premiums paid by plan sponsors to fund 
PBGC, improving the agency’s financial 
outlook. But added regulation could lead more 
employers to terminate their DB plans and 
further undermine traditional pension 
coverage.  
• Bolstering Financial Condition of State and 
Local Government Plans: Large unfunded 
pension obligations in the public sector, which 
are not insured by the federal government, 
could eventually force state and local 
governments to raise taxes, renege on their 
pension promises, or cut back on other 
services. Rising retiree health benefit costs 
will likely further strain state and local 
government finances. 
• Improving Phased Retirement Options: 
Many workers say they would prefer to switch 
to part-time work with their current employer 
as they grow older, rather than moving 
directly from full-time work to complete 
retirement (AARP 2003). At the same time, 
few workers can afford to cut back their hours 
without collecting retirement benefits. Federal 
law limits employers’ ability to make DB plan 
payments to active workers. PPA recently 
eased these restrictions, but most employers 
are still unable to pay DB plan benefits to 
workers on the payroll younger than age 62.   
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Notes 
1. Other DC plans include deferred profit-sharing plans 
and employee stock ownership plans. Only private for-
profit firms may offer 401(k) plans, named after the 
section of the tax code that governs them. Equivalent 
plans are known as 403(b) plans in the nonprofit sector 
and 457(b) plans in the public sector. 
2. DB plans do not have to offer an annuity, however, if 
the expected lifetime benefit value does not exceed 
$5,000. 
3. This total excludes the self-employed, workers in 
private households, and government workers. 
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